



¿Hay lugar para la teleología en la filosofía de la naturaleza contemporánea? La propuesta de Mariano Artigas

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Abstract: Mariano Artigas described in *The Mind of the Universe* that the four main objections against teleology are that it is *invalid*, *useless*, *impossible* and *illegitimate*. However, other writers have argued that teleology was replaced by functionality. They consider teleological reasoning as an absurd, because it implies that an inexistent future can direct the existent present. In Artigas's answer against these objections, he assumes that teleology can be understood in at least four ways: (i) its purpose as *the end of a process*, (ii) as *the goal of a tendency*, (iii) as *the value to a subject* or (iv) as *the objective of a plan*.

In this paper I emphasize the equivalency between the ways to understand teleology and the objections against them. That is, teleology as *objective of a plan* and as its *illegitimacy*; between teleology as *a value to a subject* and its *uselessness*; between teleology as an *end of a process* and as its *invalidity*; and between teleology as *a goal of a tendency* and as its *impossibility*.

I also analyze if the four meanings of teleology and there equivalencies are sufficient to answer the objections according to which teleology is replaced by functionality. If this replacement is true, it supposes that the future is not better than the present. On the contrary, the teleological reasoning apparently implies that the future state guides the present. Mariano Artigas discusses this proposal, and I evaluate his answer to figure out if it is possible to assume a place to teleology in the present-day philosophy of nature.